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Abstract: 
 
Abstract:  
The paper deals with the problems of responsibility in modern intelligence 
agencies. The papers central part is a central chapter of identifying the challenges 
of conducting intelligence inside the democracies, and how to legitimize such 
activities. To identify whether such legitimization is found in today’s intelligence 
organization, three case studies are investigated. The cases investigated are the 
United States, the United Kingdom and Denmark. For the Danish case, the paper 
draws on material collected from interviews with politicians involved in Danish 
intelligence from the political point of view. 
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1. Defining the field of research 
The main purpose of this paper is to identify the various levels of responsibility in 
intelligence matters concerning intelligence on a national level. By directly 
observing today’s organizational structures of various western intelligence 
agencies, you can sometimes catch a glimpse of how the politicians behind the 
agencies have thought intelligence ought to be structured and governed. As one 
quickly learns when diving into the field of intelligence studies, intelligence can 
hardly be controlled in a matter that is normally desired by politicians. This is due 
to the very ways intelligence agencies are operating and the communication 
problems all agencies are facing:  
How much do we tell our bosses, and how much do I tell the guy next to me? 
There are several reasons for such questioning in intelligence agencies. On an 
individual level, a person can have personal ambitions of advancing inside or 
outside the agency itself. Subsequently, it can be harmful to bring certain things to 
the boss’ attention, whether it be too early or at all. This is hardly any different 
than most other organizations, public or private.  
 
 One of the most debated issues, when it comes to national intelligence, are the 
problems employees are faced with when it comes to “lateral” and “horizontal” 
information sharing. What differs intelligence agencies from other organizations 
is the need for secrecy. Any set of eyes that are observing intelligence material are 
potentially an enemy agent and thereby a threat, and the shorter the distance in the 
chain of communication of intelligence is from the source of the collected 
information to the intelligence consumers, the better. However, the more 
comprehensive the information flow is, the more possible it is to catch cases of 
bad intelligence and steer away from failures.  
 
 This give and take situation is common in the intelligence world. Whenever a 
failure does occur, the question of who is responsible for that incident arises. 
When talking of day to day intelligence work, both vertical and horizontal 
information sharing is very important. This is due to both the actual conducting of 
intelligence matters, as well as for supplying the “consumers” of intelligence with 
good products of intelligence. When observing the vertical information sharing 
problems in intelligence agencies, a certain situation called “plausible deniability” 
is part of everyday life. Explained, plausible deniability is a situation where a 
politician or agency leader of some sort can with 100% certainty say that he or she 
did not know of a certain issue inside the agency or of its methods. This is due to 
the fact that the agency employees are working on their own initiative and that he 
or she was never really informed of the findings or lack thereof.  The conducting 
of intelligence matters lies in somewhat of a grey zone in a democracy. Most 
politicians and bureaucrats have ambitions of keeping their jobs and advancing. 
Combine this with intelligence analysts’ ambitions or patriotic feelings toward the 
5 
agency or its leaders, and the means of plausible deniability can be thought to be 
applied quite often.  
 
 The problem which we intend to investigate is this: when things go wrong, and 
a nation or agency ends up with a case of “bad intelligence” or “intelligence 
failure”, where does the responsibility belong, and how is it localized inside the 
organizational structures? To identify these problems in responsibility placement, 
we are going do a backtracking through the levels in intelligence agencies in order 
to show various applications of oversight and responsibility in order to make 
intelligence agencies more acceptable in today’s modern democracies. We will 
also give some thought to show how agencies or communities are structured to 
give the politicians control and the possibility of conducting oversight of their 
intelligence communities.  
 
 In this paper, we are making a description of the central elements of 
intelligence in western democracies, based on research material and newspaper 
articles. With the use of this knowledge we are going to build up a model with 
respect to conducting intelligence in democracies1. This model will serve as our 
base rules for outlining how a theoretic ideal for responsibility in conducting 
intelligence should be handled and placed. Second, we are going to show three 
case studies on how three western countries are organizing their intelligence 
agencies to cope with responsibility and intelligence failures, and give an 
assessment on how the respective country fits into our theoretic model of 
intelligence and responsibility. For the Danish case we have been blessed with the 
opportunity to get input from politicians who have previously been part of the 
Danish intelligence community serving as ministers responsible for each of the 
two Danish intelligence agencies. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 We can only debate intelligence in democracies, since these are the only forms of government 
where intelligence is treated as part of the democratic institution, with the need for oversight and 
political management to keep the agencies and agents democratic in nature. An autocratic or 
totalitarian government does not answer to its public like a democratic one does, and therefore 
does not have to structure their agencies the same way democracies do. 
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2. Democracy and Intelligence 
2.1.1. Failures & bad intelligence 
When talking of intelligence in general, failure and bad intelligence are key issues 
are most democracies, it is therefore necessary to understand how such failures or 
breakdowns occur but also to understand the difference between bad and failure.  
 
 Since most organizations find themselves in situations where information 
turned out to be wrong, so do intelligence organizations. The major difference 
between bad knowledge from intelligence organizations and other types of 
knowledge is that in the case the intelligence failures, the result might be fatal and 
devastating in the case of armed conflict as a result of bad intelligence. One can 
easily imagine the situation in a courtroom where an innocent person on trial is 
convicted based on bad detective work, by actual evidence placement or 
neglecting information presented during the investigation. The same situation can 
be thought applied in various governments’ national assessment groups e.g. the 
American Nation Security Council (NSC) or the British Joint Intelligence 
Committee (JIC). When we recall the time leading up the coalition’s invasion of 
Iraq in 2003, American and British intelligence agencies/governments vigorously 
argued that Iraq was in possession of weapons of mass destruction, and presented 
an armada of arguments and cases where Iraq had sought to acquire nuclear 
technology and materials. If we were to go over each case by case, how many of 
these cases will today be identified as failures would vary a little depending on the 
eyes looking at the cases. However, if observing the overall mission of 
identifying, whether Iraq possessed WMD’s or not before the invasion, it must be 
said to be a failure.  
 
This particular intelligence mission was a failure for several reasons.  
1. Because the assessment of the intelligence provided by the agencies was 
interpreted with a motivation of proving that Iraq possessed WMD’s, not 
actually to figure out whether they actually did or not. Another reason 
could be that the analysts were anticipating certain patterns or information, 
and therefore came to conclusions too early in the analysis process.2 
2. Much of the information collection was incompetent and ended up 
providing the policy makers with faulty information or bad intelligence. 
 
 This failure can therefore said to be based in the two following parts of the 
intelligence process:3 
• Evaluation: The level in intelligence agencies with the task of evaluating 
source reliability and credibility. When recalling what happened in the 
                                                 
2 Ref. to Intelligence failure sources Herman 1996 : p. 228 
3 Ref. to the elements of the NATO Intelligence doctrine: Herman 1996: p. 100 
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pre-Iraq invasion debate, it now appears that some of the intelligence 
collected for this purpose was nothing more than college reports and 
rumors in the intelligence world.4 Further arguments for incompetent work 
in the evaluation level can be found in the US Senates’ report of “Report 
on the US intelligence community’s prewar intelligence assessments on 
Iraq”, where it is showed that the Nation Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on 
Iraq’s WMD’s capabilities was put together in matter of weeks, unlike 
other estimates of this kind and depth which normally takes months. And 
according analysts who took part in the production of the NIE, the 
deadline of the NIE established by the DCI (Director of Central 
Intelligence) had a negative influence on the quality of the final estimate.5 
• Interpretation: The level which interprets the collected and analyzed 
intelligence by the various agencies. This level is to assess what is 
important enough to act on, and what is not. This is the level closest to the 
policy makers, and is likely the level with the most influence but also with 
the most pressure from those in power to present usable intelligence for 
the current issues at hand. Like the Iraq case in 2002-2003 where this level 
ought to have seen the missing quality of the NIE on Iraq’s WMD’s 
capabilities, instead they did not, the estimate reached the policy makers in 
Congress and the President, providing them with bad intelligence based on 
poor sources and bad evaluation work. 
 
 The question is, of course, whether the failure comes from purely bad 
evaluation work done by the CIA, or from the lack of decisive interpretation of 
the NIE later presented to the policy makers, or if the pressure from the President 
and Congress pushed the CIA and DCI to quickly deliver the intelligence needed 
to go to war on a “legitimate” basis? There have in several articles in newspapers 
and in other media providing allegations of such pressure; however during the 
Senates’ investigation on pre-war Iraq intelligence there has been no evidence of 
such pressure from either the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) or from 
the DCI or other leading members of the intelligence community and 
administration.6 However, there have been recordings of individuals presenting 
the CIA ombudsman with specific cases of political pressure regarding the 
investigation of Iraq’s ties with Al Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden. In these cases 
after 9/11, there was intense pressure to get it right, but also many 
                                                 
4 Ref. To college report for use in Iraq arguments see Idaho Observer article : 
http://proliberty.com/observer/20030207.htm 
5 Ref. To the NIE and the quests for such an estimate see Senate Iraq WMD report page 299 (print 
edition) 309 (PDF edition), the report can be found at http://intelligence.senate.gov/iraqreport2.pdf 
6 Ref. To the Senate WMD report page 359 (print edition) 369 (PDF edition) 
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misunderstandings in various agencies’ analysis departments, in particular the 
DIA,7 but never with orders like, “change this” or similar pressure. 
 
 When all this is said, we must argue that the Iraq WMD intelligence provided 
in 2002-2003 cannot with a 100% certainty be said to be an actual intelligence 
failure. The argument of pressure on the intelligence communities cannot be 
proven, and locating the mistakes done in the pre-war time is quite hard due to 
limitations in what has been released by the US Senate, The White House and the 
CIA. We are therefore also forced to speculate a little on the events leading up to 
the invasion. 
It seems like that there was a general understanding in the US intelligence 
communities that evidence regarding Iraq’s WMD projects (especially with the 
case of the use of college reports) was used in the final arguments presented to 
policy makers in Washington. Whether this understanding came from actual 
pressure from the administration or from a case of group thinking in a common 
feeling of patriotism or similar is hard to guess and argue for, however it seems 
like that the US intelligence community failed in catching its own mistakes and 
poor investigation of sources and material in the leading up to the invasion of Iraq 
2003.  
 
 Where the case of Iraqi WMD’s can discussed whether to be actual failure or 
not, the case of the Allied landing on D-Day during World War II, if a true 
testimony to intelligence failure in its finest definition. As part of the amphibious 
landing in Normandy on June 6 1944 the allies had provided the known German 
spies in London with the information that the landing would happen some place 
else and at some other time than it actually did. This meant that the majority of 
German forces where localized farther up north in Holland and Belgium where the 
invasion was believed to take place. This of course meant the allies were given 
less resistance at the landings and the Sword, Juno, Gold, Omaha and Utah 
beaches than had the main German defense systems been located there. Like most 
failures through time, this German intelligence failure was based on an 
intelligence success on the other side.8 
 
 One of the major sources for intelligence failures is the lack of imagination, or 
at least intellectual imagination. This was for instance the case of the Allied 
success of the breaking of the German Enigma cipher suit during World War II, 
where German intelligence officers and researchers where absolutely sure that the 
enigma code could not be broken. This a kind of intellectual hubris, where the 
technological advantage is lost due to lack of imagination of self critique followed 
                                                 
7 Ref. to OSD understandings of Iraqi involvement in the World Trade Center bombings 1993 and 
possibly 9/11 to.  See Senate Iraq WMD report: 359 (print edition) 369 (PDF edition) 
8 Ref. to Intelligence failure balance between the opposing forces, Herman 1996 : p. 227 
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by further developments and new technology.9 This is clearly one of the main 
arguments for why the western intelligence agencies need to maintain their 
current levels of funding. 
 
2.1.2. A Democratic Model of Intelligence 
As one of the goals for this paper, a model of intelligence conducted in 
democracies is to be constructed, we take our initial viewpoints from the basic 
rules in realism in IR theory that every nation strives for continued survival. 
Intelligence about enemies and friends serves the government to know of ill will 
towards its nation. Because of the power intelligence has provided so many power 
holders over time, practically all states has some sort of intelligence community, 
this includes democratic states also. One of the most troubling aspects of 
intelligence activities is their perceived lack of accountability. Operating in 
secrecy, intelligence agencies are seen not simply as mysterious, but often as 
uncontrolled. 
 
 Compared with other institutions of governments, intelligence agencies do pose 
unique difficulties when it comes to providing accountability. They cannot 
disclose all their activities to the public without disclosing them to their targets at 
the same time. As a result, intelligence agencies are not subject to the same rigors 
of public or congressional debate or the same scrutiny by the media as other 
government agencies. Their budgets are secret; their operations are secret; their 
assessments are secret. 
  
 Intelligence agencies, however, are institutions within a democratic form of 
government, responsible not only to the government, but to the elected 
representatives of the people, and therefore ultimately, to the people themselves. 
Since the public in any given democratic state chooses representatives for 
parliaments and governments to rule on behalf of them, the representatives are 
intended to rule the wishes of the people, even though sometime the people have 
not uttered it explicitly10, hence the public are entitled to answers about 
government activities. 
 
 What can be concluded from this democratic viewpoint is that, even though 
intelligence is often seen as a “necessary evil”, intended to serve and protect the 
interests of whatever nation’s population, the public is served by intelligence 
through the politicians elected to represent the public and secure their wishes for 
security and stability in order to strive for the fundamental desire for survival. The 
administration of intelligence is therefore conducted by the political majority, 
thereby potentially producing classic political polarization between the 
                                                 
9 Ref. to source of Intelligence failures, Herman 1996 : p. 232 
10 Ref. to the public demand’s realization, Gilljam & Hermansson 2003: Chapter 2. 
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government and the opposition; it should therefore come as no surprise that those 
who often question intelligence operations are typically either the people or the 
political opposition. 
 
 Intelligence, whether used to thwart a terrorist attack or prevent an overthrow 
of the democratic establishment clearly serves a vital role in any democratic state. 
All of the points listed above further serve to reinforce the fact that most people in 
democracies accept a certain degree of intelligence activity by their government.  
 
 But the role of intelligence in a democracy is a slippery slope. It’s not terribly 
difficult for a government to politicize intelligence. This is due to the fact that 
most governments are in charge of the intelligence communities and the means of 
oversight. This reinforces the concept that if a government were to make the 
decision to go to war (based on political motives and/or private interests), it could 
use whatever means at its disposal to “justify” its case. Intelligence is one of the 
most (if not the most) important tools to substantiate a need for armed 
intervention. As mentioned earlier, there were theories of such abuse of power 
during the pre-war debate of Iraq’s alleged weapons of mass destruction, however 
no proof was found for these allegations.  
 
 When observing the two classic types of intelligence, Security Intelligence and 
Foreign Intelligence, there is a clear cut difference between those when discussing 
their role in a democracy. Some security intelligence activity seems necessary to 
secure the public’s safety, however enforcing too much could easiky escalate to a 
violation of the public’s civil liberties. The level of acceptance is likely to left up 
the individual and his or hers ideas of safety and need for intelligence to secure 
that safety. What can often be seen in today’s intelligence communities is that 
most agencies will use whatever methods they are allowed to within the law, and 
to secure that no one in the agencies interprets the law wrong or act outside of the 
law intentionally, several levels oversight is needed. These levels could be 
imagined to be controlled by both the public in some way, the courts and by the 
legislating politicians. When observing the reheated debates of freedom of speech 
and other civil liberties in Europe following the recent Muslim extremist activities 
such the as the murder of Theo Van-Gogh, is seems understandable that many 
people value their democratic liberties very much. To nurture these values and 
help satisfy the public, the model of having a multilayered oversight system, can 
definitely be said to bring a high degree of legitimacy to the intelligence activities 
in democracies. 
 
 So when does the role of intelligence in a democracy go too far? Are things 
such as the Patriot Act really in the best interests of the people, or another thinly-
veiled tool used by the government to prevent political dissent and take away 
people’s personal liberties in the name of national security? In this age of 
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information technology, can an Orwellian state where “big brother” is always 
watching our every move really be so far-fetched? 
 
 If we are try to summarize this into a theory for conducting intelligence in a 
modern western democratic state, and then we will have the four following points: 
• Security is needed to secure a nation’s survival, and intelligence has 
several times proved that it is a very strong tool for providing alert 
mechanisms against future attacks. 
• Intelligence material can be manipulated by governments and individuals 
in the agencies though a variety of motives. At times certain intelligence 
operations and initiatives also need to be kept secret in order to maintain 
the advantage compared to the enemies. All of this serves to alienate 
intelligence agencies from the public, who cannot get precise information 
of what the intelligence agencies are doing. 
• To secure the democratic rights for freedom of the people and help prevent 
abuse of power, oversight mechanisms can be installed. If structured 
correctly, such mechanisms can help bring legitimacy to otherwise 
illegitimate and secret organizations such as intelligence agencies. 
• Through a correct balance of intelligence policies, budget revisions and 
oversight mechanisms, a stable intelligence community with acceptance of 
the people can be created. But in order to achieve this situation, one very 
important factor is needed form all sides, and that is trust. The politicians 
needs to trust some independent body of conducting some of the oversight, 
and the public needs to trust that such oversight procedures are done in 
their interest, and that some things needs to be kept secret if the nation is 
survive based on good intelligence about adversaries 
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3. Case Studies 
This part of the paper concerns the investigation of three countries intelligence 
communities, and ways of dealing with the conduction of intelligence, oversight 
and intelligence failures. 
 
 The method of investigating each country varies a little from case to case. This 
is due to the very different amounts and types of material associated with each 
country. 
• For the US case we have been able to rely on a vast amount of literature 
and government reports as well as newspaper and other articles. The 
openness of the American intelligence communities has also provided 
good information about their conduction of day to day intelligence work. 
• For the UK case the material were somewhat more limited in case of 
research literature and government reports, however due the British media 
interest in intelligence, there have still been more than enough to cover 
this papers needs.  
• For the Danish case, which has proven to be really interesting, we have 
been severely limited when it comes to research literature. This is partly 
due to the fact that it is normally only the Danish media that is concerned 
with Danish intelligence, and the amount of articles is also very limited 
compared with that of the US and UK cases. But we have been fortunate 
enough to conduct interviews with two former ministers both in charge of 
one of the two Danish intelligence agencies. This has produced some very 
interesting material, but with a slightly different approach than the two 
other cases due to the fact that some of the case concerns the chapter of 
political input, which investigates politicians views on oversight on 
political influence on conducting intelligence. 
 
3.1. The United States 
3.1.1. History 
 
Of all the major powers of the last 100 years, the United States has the briefest 
history of national intelligence11.  The U.S. did not have a permanent national 
intelligence office until the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 
1947. In 1947, President Truman signed into the law the National Security Act, 
which created a post-war national security framework. Among the creation of 
institutions such as the National Security Council (NSC) and the Secretary of 
Defense position was the CIA. At the time of its creation, the CIA was the only 
agency charged with a “national” intelligence mission. From the beginning, the 
                                                 
11 Ref. To. “The Role of Intelligence in the United States Today”. 
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language regarding the CIA’s functions and authorities was rather vague. Words 
such as “espionage” and “spying” were intentionally left out of the statute. The 
1947 act also expressly prohibited the CIA having any police, subpoena, law-
enforcement powers, or internal security functions, which was reflective of the 
common desire not to have a U.S. “Gestapo”.  
 
 The 1950s and 1960s saw the continuing intensification and expansion of the 
Cold War, with a subsequent expansion in the scope and power of U.S. 
intelligence agencies. The CIA was making enormous progress, establishing itself 
as a key player in the defense and foreign policy arenas during the Korean War. 
Further revisions were to come for the CIA, among them the establishment of a 
permanent “watchdog” commission (consisting of House and Senate members) to 
oversee the CIA to make sure its steadily increasing powers were not abused. 
  
 The 1970s was characterized by turmoil and reform within the intelligence 
communities. The intelligence functions of the government continued, but 
Congress began to take a much more active role in determining their cost and 
overseeing their execution. Press articles covered allegations of collection efforts 
undertaken against U.S citizens during the Vietnam war, as well as attempts to 
assassinate foreign leaders or destabilize communist regimes. In 1974, in reaction 
to reports of CIA's support to the non-Communist resistance forces in Angola, 
Congress passed an amendment which for the first time required that the President 
to report any covert CIA operations in a foreign country (other than for 
intelligence collection) to the relevant congressional committee12. 
  
 In 1975, President Ford ordered measures to provide improved internal 
supervision of CIA activities; additional restrictions on CIA's domestic activities; 
a ban on mail openings; and an end to wiretaps, abuse of tax information, and the 
testing of drugs on unsuspecting persons. A number of restrictions on intelligence 
agencies were also instituted, including a ban on assassinations as an instrument 
of U.S. policy.13 To monitor compliance with the order, a new Intelligence 
Oversight Board was established within the Executive Office of the President. The 
Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980 provided that the heads of intelligence 
agencies would keep the oversight committees fully and currently informed of 
their activities, which included any significant anticipated intelligence activity. 
 
 The 1980s was characterized as a decade of growth and scandal. The vast 
majority of rules and guidelines adopted during the Ford and Carter 
Administrations remained in place. However, by the middle of the decade, the 
U.S. experienced a series of spy scandals, and the first serious breach of the 
                                                 
12 Ref. to “The Evolution of the U.S. Intelligence Community-An Historical Overview”. 
13 Due to Posse Comitatus Act proscribing that the Army and other military services may not 
”Execute Laws” the possibilities of assassinating foreign leaders becomes even more limited. 
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oversight arrangements with the Congress. Various efforts were taken within the 
Executive branch to identify and correct shortcomings in counterintelligence and 
security. No legislation was enacted for some time. This was due in part to the fall 
of the Berlin Wall, and dramatic changes taking place in the Soviet Union, which 
lessened the intensity of focusing on problems with spies. 
 
 The three years following the election of President Bush saw profound changes 
in the world that had enormous impacts on the Intelligence Community. With the 
end of the Cold War, some began to question whether an intelligence capability 
was needed any longer; others urged significant retrenchment. Leaders within the 
Intelligence Community began streamlining their agencies and reorienting toward 
new missions, with a greater focus on transnational threats.  
 
 Any significant change in the American Intelligence community during the 
1990’s seemed fairly trivial in comparison to the massive shake-ups that ensued in 
wake of the catastrophic events of September 11. Prior to this tragedy, the 
intelligence community often emanated an aura to the outside world as being on 
the cutting-edge of worldwide intelligence; one could say the self-appointed 
standard-bearer. The likelihood of a failure so widespread and that revealed 
shortcomings on so many levels of the Intelligence community as 911 seemed 
impossible. Simultaneously with the collapse of the twin towers, the Cold-War-
inspired infrastructure of the American Intelligence Community instantly became 
out-dated. Reforms were needed, and demand for increased oversight of the 
American intelligence community was urged by several members of congress. In 
November 2003 the House and the Senate passed the biggest intelligencereform 
since World War II (at least on paper that is). The reform is intended to implement 
many initiatives, the most profound being the new post of National Intelligence 
Director (NID) which were one of the recommendations by the 9/11 Commission. 
3.1.2. Organization 
The American Intelligence Community was not created, nor does it operate, as a 
single, tightly knit organization. Rather, it has evolved over nearly 50 years and 
now amounts to a confederation of separate agencies and activities with distinctly 
different histories, missions and lines of command. Not surprisingly, the 
oftentimes shortsighted nature of their growth resulted in some duplication of 
activities and functions. All but the CIA reside in policy departments and serve 
departmental as well as national interests. Their directors are selected by the 
Secretaries of the departments they serve, although in some cases consultation 
with the DCI (Director of Central Intelligence) is required. 
 
 The agencies are split into three groups. The first is those agencies concerned 
with counter intelligence within the U.S. borders. The second is counter-
intelligence, offensive intelligence activities, and covert operations outside of the 
U.S. And lastly, those groups concerned with military intelligence inside and 
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outside the U.S. Management of the intelligence agencies is conducted by the 
President of the United States, through the Director of Central Intelligence, who 
also is the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and intelligence 
oversight is conducted via the Congress' Intelligence Committees. 
 
 The only agency which can conduct intelligence activities (at least according to 
publicly disclosed intelligence documents or charters) is the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI). The individual military intelligence groups may cooperate 
with the FBI to catch spies in their areas of control, but only the FBI can actually 
conduct surveillance and make arrests on their own. In practice though, it is 
probably more accurate to say that the FBI is involved in all surveillances and 
arrests, whereas the military intelligence groups are legally bound to coordinate 
with the FBI. The only other exception is the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) 
who may conduct drug related surveillance on their own. And of course city, 
county and state police may conduct their own surveillance as necessary.14 
 
 Intelligence in the U.S. is controlled by the Executive Branch, with the 
President acting on guidance from the Director of Central Intelligence and the 
Department of Defense. Presidential directives establish the high level goals of the 
U.S. Intelligence Community, and organizations authorized by the President then 
define the collection, analysis, and interpretation of intelligence data, and control 
the content and dissemination of the end product of intelligence gathering. 
 
 The major branches of the military have their own intelligence agencies, all 
reporting to the Pentagon via the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). The 
military agencies remain in the U.S. because of the ever increasing need for 
intelligence on the technologies of each of the service areas. For example, the 
Navy needs up-to-date intelligence on the submarine technology of American 
adversaries, the Air Forces concentrates on aircraft and space vehicles. 
 
 Despite their separate responsibilities, lines of authority, and sources of 
funding, the United States has sought to operate these agencies as a "Community" 
in order to best serve the nation's interests. Today, intelligence remains the only 
area of highly complex government activity where overall management across 
department and agency lines is seriously attempted. 
  
 The (vast) majority of U.S. intelligence agencies are within the Department of 
Defense. Together these agencies spend 85 percent of the total U.S. intelligence 
funds and employ 85 percent of intelligence personnel15. Nearly two-thirds of all 
the DoD intelligence personnel are active duty military.  
 
                                                 
14 Only when legitimate by law of course! 
15 Ref. To “Preparing for the 20th Century: An Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence” 
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 Most of these agencies have multiple roles. Not only are they responsible for 
producing intelligence and analysis in response to national requirements, but they 
also respond to departmental and tactical requirements. Certain DoD intelligence 
agencies are designated by law as "combat support agencies," signifying their 
roles in supporting tactical military operations.  
 
 The Department of Defense also is the largest single user of national 
intelligence. In times of war or crisis, its requirements take preeminence over 
those of other agencies. In addition to supporting military operations, national 
intelligence contributes significantly to other DoD functions such as planning 
force structures, making weapons acquisition decisions, and conducting 
relationships with foreign governments. 
  
 While the elements of the intelligence community that belong to departments 
other than the DoD are, by comparison, very small, some of the same dynamics 
come into play. They receive their funding from their parent department; their 
personnel report, directly or indirectly, to the head of the department; and they 
have departmental duties and responsibilities wholly apart from their roles as 
members of the intelligence community. 
  
3.1.3. Oversight 
To solve the dilemma of producing good intelligence and at the same maintaining 
democratic control of the intelligence agencies, special oversight arrangements for 
intelligence have been established within the Executive and Legislative branches. 
In the Congress, special committees in each House are charged with the oversight 
function, serving as surrogates for their respective bodies and for the public as 
well. Within the Executive branch, Inspectors General have been established 
within the agencies themselves or within their parent organizations. The White 
House also has an intelligence oversight office. Because of the need for secrecy, 
these bodies normally carry out their oversight functions in private, reporting as 
necessary and appropriate to the public without exposing the intelligence activities 
they are overseeing.  
 
 Many Americans believe that U.S. intelligence agencies do not obey the laws 
of the United States or the policies of the President. This is simply not the case. 
U.S. intelligence agencies are bound, and consider themselves bound, by the 
Constitution and laws of the United States, including treaty obligations and other 
international agreements entered into by the United States. They also are bound 
by Presidential orders, guidelines issued by the Attorney General, and numerous 
internal directives. Employees who violate those laws and policies can be held 
criminally liable or subjected to administrative sanctions, like any other 
government employee.  
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 There are many restrictions on the powers of intelligence agencies in the U.S. 
Among these are restrictions on undisclosed participation by intelligence agency 
personnel in organizations in the U.S., restrictions on experimentation on human 
subjects, and a ban on engaging in assassination. Intelligence agencies also are 
bound by guidelines approved by the Attorney General that govern the collection, 
analysis, and dissemination of information on U.S. citizens and aliens admitted for 
permanent residence. These guidelines prohibit intelligence agencies from 
collecting information about U.S. citizens relating to the exercise of their First 
Amendment rights, effectively precluding a return to the large-scale domestic 
surveillance programs undertaken by intelligence agencies during the Vietnam 
era. Internal guidelines also limit the use of clergy, journalists, and academics for 
operational purposes. In addition to the policy restraints on their activities, 
intelligence agencies and their employees are subject to the judicial process. Like 
other government agencies and employees, they can be sued for actions 
undertaken in the course of their official duties. They can be subpoenaed in civil 
and criminal cases, and they must produce information when ordered by the 
courts. 
  
 The most substantive public disclosures of intelligence information have come 
at the initiative of the intelligence agencies themselves. Especially since the end 
of the Cold War, intelligence agencies have released to the public significant 
information of historical interest, including thousands of photographs taken by the 
first satellite system (known as CORONA), decrypted KGB messages regarding 
espionage activities in the United States (codenamed VENONA), and sanitized 
versions of NIEs on Soviet military strength. General information about the 
organization and functions of intelligence agencies also has been released, and, 
where possible, responses to media inquiries are provided. Most of America's 
intelligence agencies, in fact, maintain public affairs offices which serve as 
official channels of information to the outside world. Thus, substantial 
accountability to the public is achieved in a variety of ways, wholly apart from the 
accountability achieved through the special oversight mechanisms. 
 
 The law specifically obligates the President to ensure that intelligence agencies 
keep the committees "fully and currently informed" of their activities, including 
all "significant anticipated intelligence activities" and all "significant intelligence 
failures," and make available any information requested by either of the two 
committees. The law does not define the categories of information to be reported, 
leaving intelligence agencies to ignore or misinterpret them at their own peril 
(which occasionally happens). The President also is obligated by law to notify the 
intelligence committees (or, in special cases, the congressional leadership) of all 
covert action "findings" once they have been approved by the President. The 
committees have no authority to disapprove these findings, but can prohibit the 
expenditure of funds for such activities in subsequent years. As a practical matter, 
therefore, their views on covert action programs are given considerable weight. 
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An enormous amount of detailed information-some extraordinarily sensitive-is 
provided to the legislative overseers by the Intelligence Community. Hearings are 
held frequently; meetings with staff occur daily. Disputes over access have arisen 
from time to time and occasionally the oversight process has broken down (e.g. 
the Iran-contra affair), but, by and large, the system has worked well. Over time, 
the agencies have come to appreciate what the committees expect, and the 
committees have come to appreciate the security concerns of the agencies and 
been willing to accommodate them. Both committees have established secure 
environments for the discussion and storage of classified information and have 
maintained good track records in terms of protecting the information shared with 
them. 
  
3.1.4. Case Conclusions 
The intelligence community’s more out-of-date capabilities are devoted to 
exploitation of clandestinely acquired information that collectively sheds only a 
narrow light on the broad array of national security threats. Intelligence (in its 
boiled-down essence) is information, and information is critical to the power of 
terrorists as well nation-states. In order to gain greater access to the secrets that 
transnational organizations and nation-states seek to deny the U.S. as well as to 
exploit the explosion in public information, the community must sharpen its 
collection and analytic tools. As it stands, agencies have produced failures based 
on incompetence and bad structure, while simultaneously eluding responsibility 
when the failures happen. Reforms need to be aimed at finding where to lay the 
accountability (and fixing the problem) when things go wrong. Rather than 
blaming mistakes on bad analysis or faulty sources, reforms should be 
implemented that would prevent such shortcomings in the first place. Rather than 
pointing the finger and firing a “fall guy” (such as the dismissal of George Tenet) 
as a “quick fix” solution, sweeping reforms need to be carried through on all 
levels of the intelligence community. 
 
 Such reforms instigated by independent reviews and implemented either by 
executive order or by congressional legislation need to be aimed at transforming 
the intelligence community from failed top-down institutions based on obsolete 
business models of the 1950s to the nimble, bottom-up, flat, and networked 
organizations that thrive in the age of information technology16. Such networked 
oranizations would also increase the efficiency of oversight and responsibility and 
would likely serve to limit blunders such as the inability to prevent 9/11 and the 
overblown belief in Iraq’s WMD capabilities. The United States needs to reforge 
its obsolete intelligence community if it is to match wits with transnational threats 
to American security such as al Qaeda and traditional threats stemming from 
                                                 
16 Ref. To Russel, Richard L. ”Intelligence Failures” 
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nation-states with the political intent and military means to challenge American 
interests and power.  
 
 The controversy surrounding the American pre-war intelligence assessment of 
Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs dominates the media. Behind-the-
scenes investigations birthed by the Iraq performance as well as the events of 
September 11, 2001 offer a chance to chart and implement much-needed reforms 
of a beleaguered intelligence community. The American policymaking 
community and the general public can definitely be argued to have the right to 
ask: What is the intelligence community’s contribution to national security — 
expert analysts who make sense of the world for our decision makers or 
bureaucrats who push paper? 
 
 Another symptom of this densely layered bureaucratic structure is the capacity 
for individuals to evade responsibility. Given the fact that gathered information 
passes through so many hands and floats over so many desks before it is finally 
labeled as “valued intelligence”, the blame for faulty intelligence can be 
conveniently placed wherever those who have the most power and influence 
would find it most suitable or believable to the public. As an example: Where 
would American policy makers be more inclined to lay the blame for the failed 
intelligence regarding Iraq’s WMD programs? On some “shady inside source in 
Baghdad”, or on the policy makers and/or private interests pushing equally shady 
agendas? The former portrays a much more believable story to the public, and it 
absolves the policy makers of blame. 
 
 There are also concerns that the Pentagon put a political spin on analysis to 
press the president into war in Iraq. Nevertheless, charges of politicizing 
intelligence are oftentimes overblown (but still crave deeper investigation 
regardless). The CIA is indeed best positioned bureaucratically to produce 
intelligence analysis that is separate from policy interests. But (and it’s a big but) 
as long as the DCI continues to have access to the president it is not likely that 
Pentagon analysis will limit the president’s policies.  
 
 There has also been widespread criticism of Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld’s support for the establishment of an undersecretary of defense for 
intelligence. Critics argue that the position will allow the secretary of defense and 
the military to dominate the IC. These criticisms may have some merit, but they 
miss a larger point. To be sure, the intelligence community is increasingly 
dominated by the Pentagon, which controls about 85 percent of the intelligence 
budget (as was mentioned earlier). That budgetary power undermines the 
authority and control of the DCI, who in theory is to be calling the shots for 
American intelligence. Unless the DCI controls the largest share of the 
intelligence budget, the Pentagon (with or without an undersecretary for 
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intelligence) will be able to wield supreme power, potentially separating the DCI 
more from the decisions on intelligence directives. 
 
 The call for amending the National Security Act of 1947 to establish a 
“National Intelligence Director (NID)” statutory post in and of itself will do little 
to correct the drift of intelligence toward military prerogatives. The role and 
responsibilities of the director of national intelligence are basically a rehash of the 
theoretical responsibilities and authority of the DCI. The problem of the law 
passed in both house and senate establishing the NID, is that the original ideas 
presented by the 9/11 commission recommending the installment of a NID as part 
of the cabinet, has been changed a lot, and the NID now only holds some power 
over intelligence budgets, and the DoD still holds power over its “own” agencies, 
without either the NID or DCI wield any control of those agencies. The 
establishment of the NID post is likely to do more harm than good by 
superimposing yet another ponderous layer of bureaucracy onto an already top-
heavy intelligence community superstructure17. The intelligence community 
already has its hands full trying to cope with the challenges posed by the new 
bureaucracy of the Department of Homeland Security, and the U.S. doesn’t need 
to add to this burden the establishment of a director of national intelligence in its 
current form.  
 
3.2. The United Kingdom 
3.2.1. History 
One of the oldest organized intelligence communities in the world is the UK 
communities. It dates back to before World War I18, and in 1909 the Secret 
Service Bureau (SSB) was created. In 1911 the SSB was renamed to Military 
Section 6, hence the name MI6, and in 1916 the MI5 is created. From the 
beginning the MI5 has been charged with domestic security intelligence, and is 
officially known as The Security Service, whereas the MI6 today is known by its 
official name The Secret Intelligence Service. Like the leaders of the MI6 in the 
movies of James Bond, the leader of the agency is identified by a letter, however 
not by the letter of “M” and in the movies, but by the letter “C” after the original 
chief of MI6 Captain Mansfield Cumming. The MI5 also uses this identification 
of its chief by the use of the letter “K” again named after the original chief 
Captain Vernon Kell. 
 
 In 1919 the Government Code and Cipher School (GC&CS) was created. This 
was first organized school of teaching decryption and code breaking in the world. 
                                                 
17 Ref. To. Russel, Richard L. ”Intelligence Failures” 
18 For information about British intelligence history se BBC Crime Fighters Intelligence Section at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/crime/fighters/intelligence.shtml and Herman 1996 Chapters 1-3 
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The GC&CS was in 1922 put under the administration of the Foreign Office and 
were in 1946, based on World War II experience in code breaking, reestablished 
as the Governments Communication Headquarters (GCHQ) which also is its 
current name. The GCHQ was the agency that produced the world’s first 
electronic computer, which was used for the famous breaking of the German 
enigma code during World War II. This has served the GCHQ to be reckoned as 
one the world’s best SigInt agencies. Today the GCHQ is the British version of 
the American NSA. Despite GCHQ’s quite longer actual existence, it has only 
been recognized as an actual British intelligence agency since 1983, when the 
parliament acknowledged its existence. Similarly, the MI5 was recognized 1989 
and the MI6 in 1994. These relatively late recognitions have served the fact that a 
lot of myths have existed about the British intelligence services, and that the 
British media has for several years been very interested in British intelligence 
activities, in order to prove the agencies existence, and provide the public with 
information of these agencies activities. 
 
 In 1992 the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) was created. This 
service deals only the criminal cases, which require intelligence like organizing 
and collection of information. The NCIS is also the UK link to Interpol. 
3.2.2. Organization 
The organization of British intelligence is somewhat different from the two other 
cases in this paper. Unlike both Danish and US intelligence, British intelligence is 
not divided into military intelligence and non-military intelligence, however the 
Ministry of Defense (MoD) holds a vital role the assessment of intelligence, and 
of course in the use of intelligence. The strict division between foreign and 
domestic/ security intelligence is similar to most other countries’ intelligence 
organizations. The central analysis department is vitally different from that of US 
intelligence, where the CIA operates as both the central analysis department and 
the agency which conducts covert operations. In the UK case, the MI6 operates all 
covert and clandestine operations, and the analysis of the collected information is 
done by the Central Analysis department.19 
 
 All British intelligence is managed by the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), 
which operates the agencies and sets out intelligence needs and guidelines. The 
chairman of the JIC reports to the ministers in charge of the various agencies 
whenever his of her agency needs approval for some operation or other politically 
related business.20 Like the American NSC the JIC also functions as national 
assessment group and provides warning whenever British interests around the 
world are threatened.  
 
                                                 
19 Ref. to Herman 1996 p. 31 for a organizational chart of British intelligence 
20 Ref. to the work of the JIC see http://www.fas.org/irp/world/uk/jic/  
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Each of the intelligence agencies have a minister in charge of its activities. This 
means that the pattern of providing top level responsibility inside the government 
also applies to the case of British intelligence. 
3.2.3. Oversight 
The oversight procedure in the matter of British intelligence is vested with the 
Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC), which is a committee appointed by 
the Prime Minister in consultation with the leader of the opposition, and consists 
of 9 members, all of which are members of parliament. The ISC provides 
governmental oversight of MI5, MI6 and the GCHQ by gaining access to highly 
secret information from these agencies, and are on the basis of their findings, 
preparing reports for the government, which ultimately will be made public (with 
the removal of several classified information) by presenting them to the 
Parliament.21 
3.2.4. Case conclusions 
Like the Danish case, the British intelligence community lacks independent 
oversight mechanisms. However, the fact that the public has access the most of 
the correspondence between the ISC and the government (by accessing the reports 
online) provides good legitimacy for British intelligence. 
 
 Like the other cases, British intelligence is vested with the ministers of 
Defense, Home and Foreign affairs. This places the responsibility, in the case 
abuse of power or intelligence failures, with the ministers. The organizational 
structure of the British intelligence community does however provide the 
ministers with some cover for political fallout. In cases of bad intelligence or 
actual failures, the JIC and the Central Analysis Department are located centrally 
in the analysis and assessment structure, so that in case of incompetence or bad 
luck, the ministers don’t necessarily have to answer directly to the critique, but 
can hand over some of the responsibility to these sections of national intelligence. 
 
 British intelligence has played a vital role in vestern intelligence during both 
world wars and the cold war, for British intelligence to “survive” the democratic 
battle of governments abilities to conduct good intelligence in the 21’st century, 
the openness of the agencies needs to be rethought and changed. If this are to 
happen, the British intelligence community could continue to play vital role in 
future, this is clearly through the UK’s close friendship with the U.S., and 
intelligence history, which has taught the British the value of good intelligence 
and analysis. 
 
                                                 
21 ISC reports can be found at http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/intelligence/  
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3.3. Denmark 
3.3.1. History 
Danish intelligence predates World War II, but became much more operative and 
efficient after the war. In 1948 Danish military intelligence (FET), which at that 
point still was divided into several smaller intelligence groups attached to the 
army and the navy (much like the current service intelligence agencies in the 
American military) introduced a signal Intelligence agency (Søværnets 
Radiotjeneste) based on the equipment captured from the German departure from 
Denmark. This service has later been a vital part of NATO’s surveillance of the 
East Sea. During the cold war, Denmark was ideally located where it could have 
unrestricted access the East Sea (Østersøen) where the Russian/Soviet East Sea 
fleet was to travel in and out of while patrolling in either the Atlantic or parts of 
the Polar Sea. Denmark’s cold-war military intelligence was therefore very 
valuable for NATO and in particular the US, who of course where very interested 
in soviet movement and troop locations. Furthermore the radar facility in Thule in 
Greenland provided the US with the vital function of covering the entire artic area 
with a radar warning system. To mention actual historical events, the Danish 
intelligence services provided early information about the halt of Soviet transport 
ships during the blockade of Cuba during the missile crisis of 196222. All of this 
earned Danish intelligence political willingness to cooperate and good recognition 
in the intelligence communities around the world. 
 
 The post-cold war period has been somewhat more displeasing for the Danish 
military intelligence organization. Several political scandals have occurred, and 
the Danish publics’ views on both services fell dramatically during the 90’s. The 
(at times) almost absurd secrets of the FET, has served for it to be a quite 
unfamiliar service for the public, and has only just recently installed a new open 
information policy, in particular based on its pre-Iraq estimates, which can be 
argued to have turned out be somewhat wrong.23 And like many other western 
intelligence agencies, FET has recently experienced a whistleblower case. 
Currently the previous FET analyst Frank Grevil is under charge for having 
handed out secret documents to the press, thereby disclosing the Danish 
governments estimate on Iraq’s WMD capabilities before the invasion in 2003.24 
                                                 
22 Ref. to FET History see website http://forsvaret.dk/FE/Om+FE/Historie/  
23 Depending on who in the Danish parliament you ask, they will answer somewhat differently on 
whether the intelligence provided to the Parliament was correct or not. The government argues that 
the intelligence never mentioned WMD’s, whereas the opposition argues otherwise. No formal 
investigation has been launched in Denmark concerning this matter. 
24 Frank Grevil was committed to 6 months in jail in November 2004, he immediately appealed the 
courts decision to the Danish National Court  where it currently is waiting to be handled - see 
article in Berlingske Tidende 30’th November 2004 
http://www.berlingske.dk/indland/artikel:aid=511042/  
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The Danish security intelligence service (PET) was initially known as the 
Copenhagen Discovery Police (Københavns Opdagelsespoliti) and was as the 
name indicates a purely Copenhagen-based agency. In 1939 the national security 
intelligence agency named The Security Police (SIPO). SIPO’s activities were 
suspended during the German occupation of Denmark during World War II, and 
the agency was reinstated in 1945 and renamed to the National Police 
Commissioner’s Intelligence Department (REA). The agency has until this point 
been a pure security agency with task of identifying domestic threats inside 
Denmark, in 1951 the intelligence community in Denmark were reformed and the 
PET was created, and guidelines for what where PET’s and what where FET’s 
tasks was issued. In 1958 the PET was installed under the chief police 
commissioner and has since 1960 been a 100% national service, covering the 
entire country. 
 
3.3.2. Organization 
The Danish intelligence community is organized into a classic divided structure 
with two different agencies, both with a top level management in the form of a 
minister and departmental staff. 
• PET: The Police Intelligence Service, or the security agency. 
• FET: The Defense Intelligence Service acts as both foreign intelligence 
service and as a normal military intelligence service. 
 
The PET is administered by a police chief appointed by the minister of justice and 
the FET is administered by a military command, but is according to law25 acting 
under the administration and responsibility of the minister of defense. 
 
 In light of the relatively smaller size of the agencies area of coverage, 
compared to the other two countries in the paper, the intelligence picture changes 
a little. The main reason for this is clearly the size of the intelligence budget. The 
latest numbers on budgets of US intelligence is from 1997, where it was estimated 
to $26.6 billion26, this is estimated to be in the area of $40 billion today if not 
double the 1997 numbers. This huge increase in US intelligence numbers comes 
clearly after the devastating attacks on the US September 11 2001. The US 
intelligence community took a severe beating in the aftermath, and needed 
refocusing and more funding, and the lawmakers where eager to give the 
intelligence communities the funds it needed to cope with the new threats of the 
                                                 
25 Ref. To FET website http://forsvaret.dk/FE/Om+FE/ concerning Danish law nr. 122 of 2001 §13 
article. 2 
26 Ref. To FAS website http://www.fas.org/sgp/foia/victory.html concerning a lawsuit filled 
though the freedom of information act in 1997, the CIA yielded to provide the FAS with the 
budget of the fiscal year of 1997. 
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international terrorism. In comparison, the Danish combined intelligence efforts 
are still kept secret to some level. The FET has recently begun a campaign of 
actively informing of their activities27 and is providing up to date information 
about their operating budget, which for 2005 is fixed at 447.4 million Danish kr28 
which is roughly the equivalent of $80 million. The budget of the PET is still kept 
a secret, but deriving numbers from the national budget of the Danish 
government, we can make a guess to the amount of funds spent on the FET. The 
budget of the police department of Denmark in 2005 is fixed at 7.1 billion Danish 
kr29 ~ $1.2 billion. With this number concerning the entire police department, we 
can guess that roughly the same amount is spent on the PET as on the FET, 
estimating the total Danish intelligence budget to around 1 billion Danish kr ~ 
$178 million. This modest budget presents Denmark with a range of challenges in 
the modern intelligence communities. One of the most fundamental “rules” inside 
the intelligence communities is the efforts put towards cooperation and the trading 
of intelligence. The basic rule is “I’ll show you mine, if you show me yours!” Or 
to put in another way, a country needs a good intelligence community with good 
intelligence to trade its knowledge with allies for their information.30 
 
 Like many other countries in the western coalition, Denmark is becoming more 
and more dependent on U.S. intelligence cooperation. The Danish Royal Air force 
has no real possibilities of conducting any meaningful intelligence related 
reconnaissance, and with the recent decommission of the Royal navy’s submarine 
force, the SigInt situation can definitely said to have been even more crippled than 
it already was. With these changes in the Danish intelligence picture, new ways of 
obtaining information are necessary if the Danish intelligence communities do not 
wish to be detached from the developments in the rest of the world, in particular 
with respect to the War on Terrorism. 
 
3.3.3. Oversight 
There are several levels of oversight in the Danish intelligence communities, most 
of which really only are a sort of information of general intelligence activities 
conducted by the agencies. This includes the parliaments control committee, 
                                                 
27 Informing in a manner of possibility, since most operations still will keep secret for some time, 
due to operational security and protection of foreign partner agencies. 
28 Ref. To FET website on FET budget for fiscal year of 2005 
http://forsvaret.dk/FE/Om+FE/Budget/  
29 Ref. To the Danish ministery of Finance, budget report 3 of 2004, concerning 2005 government 
expenses can be found at http://www.fm.dk/db/filarkiv/10461/webBO_dec04.pdf page 61 (both 
print and PDF version) 
30 This trade of intelligence is of course limited to the kinds of intelligence concerning non-vital-
security intelligence. One could simply imagine that any country would withhold information 
about terrorist attacks or similar. 
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which consists of members of 5 biggest parties in the national Danish parliament 
“Folketinget”. The members of this committee are to be informed of general 
intelligence activities, but are not allowed to disclose any information provided to 
them in the meetings. For oversight of the budgets of the intelligence agencies, the 
National Revision (Rigsrevisionen) is charged with conducting oversight on a 
secret basis. When it comes to actual oversight, where the agencies’ decisions are 
challenged, and the only real instance is the Wamberg-Commission. This 
commission conducts oversight concerning the registration of individuals. The 
ministry of justice installed in 1964 the Wamberg-Commission, which has since 
1978 also included the FET’s activities. The members of the Wamberg-
Commision are appointed by the government31. In the cases of intelligence 
failures, the Ministry of Justice and/or the Ministry of Defense are typically in 
charge of investigating the incident, and clear out what has happened so that the 
lawmakers in the parliament can take action. In instances of severe cases of 
intelligence failure, the parliament typically appoints some temporary (more or 
less independent) commission, which is to do the investigation on behalf of the 
parliament. Like the US and the UK, Denmark experienced a series of reports of 
bad intelligence leading up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Unlike in the US and 
the UK, no independent commission has been established to investigate that 
Danish intelligence services role in estimating the alleged WMD’s in Iraq. The 
opposition in the Danish parliament has been very displeased with this decision by 
the government. Due to the structure of the Danish parliamentary system, the 
government, with it supporting party, holds the power to block such a proposal. 
The argument for blocking an independent investigation has been that the piece of 
legislation voted into law, by the government parties  support party with the votes 
61 to 5032 allowing the war, did not use intelligence related allegations of Iraqi 
WMD’s as a foundation for going to war. When observing the questions answered 
by members of the government in the section of the Danish parliaments website 
www.ft.dk33 concerning the parliamentary debate up to vote of law point B118 on 
march 21’st 2003, the answers do actually go to references to UN inspectors Hans 
Blix and other members or reports by either UNSOM or UNMOVIC, and not to 
intelligence related material. 
                                                 
31 Ref. to the rules set out by the Ministry of Justice 1964 see 
http://www.pet.dk/Kontrol/Wamberg-
udvalget/Wambergudvalgets%20kommissorium%20af%201964.aspx  
32 Ref. to the Danish Parliament debate and vote 21’st of March 2003 Law Point B118 – see 
www.ft.dk for more information 
33 The Danish parliaments website uses a web system based on frame support, making it hard to 
make actual web link references to pages online, instead use the search engine for finding B118 of 
the 21 March 2003 
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3.3.4. Political Input 
Part of this paper was to gain a greater understanding of how politicians see their 
own role in intelligence in democracies, as well as their experiences with such. 
This has been something we have pursued with unrelinquished vigor. We have 
been fortunate enough to be able conduct interviews with two former ministers of 
the former Danish Government. The two individuals we have interviewed for this 
paper are: 
• Frank Jensen: Served in the period of 1996 to 2001 as the minister of 
justice, he currently is the political speaker of the Social Democrats34 
• Jan Trøjborg: Server in the period of 2000 to 2001 as the minister of 
defense, he currently is the speaker of business politics for the Social 
Democrats35 
Both interviews were conducted in a very relaxed atmosphere and manner where 
we had a lenghthy discussion, and they enlightened us with their viewpoints on 
intelligence as seen from both a purely Danish matter and from a more 
international point of view. We will now highlight some of what we learned from 
these two individuals during the interviews. 
 
 Both Frank Jensen and Jan Trøjborg took office before 9/11, and the Danish 
intelligence picture was at that time somewhat dominated by the political scandals 
of intelligence misusage during the 60s and 70s. This was given a lot of focus, in 
particular in the ministry of justice, due to the fact that it was the PET who had 
been registering a lot of left-wing political activists. When we asked about the 
progression of Danish intelligence over both believed that it has taken far too long 
to change the perspectives from cold-war Russian orientation to the new world 
order of trans national movement, particularly in regards to Al-Qaeda and its 
legion of. Jan Trøjborg emphasized this issue as one of the most important for 
Danish intelligence in a quite some time. According to Frank Jensen, the PET is 
now focused on the threats from international terrorists and fundamentalists. 
 
 The next big issue we took up was intelligence cooperation and intelligence 
trade. Whereas intelligence trade really isn’t that debatable (due to the fact that it 
is still very secret who you trade what with), when talking of cooperation between 
agencies and countries the need for such was emphasized by both parties once 
more. Both said that a country like Denmark is dependent on its cooperation with 
allies, and as Jan Trøjborg put it: “Denmark is maybe strong on some points and 
weak on others. It is important to have a balance.” 
Which led to the question of what Denmark’s strong points would be in the 
future? Both inclined that Denmark likely would have to rely more on analysis 
work and reduce the focus on the collection of information. Jan Trøjborg did also 
                                                 
34 For more information about Frank Jensen see http://www.frank-j.dk/  
35 For more information about Jan Trøjborg see http://www.socdem.dk/jan-troejborg/  
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add the need for more open-source collection, which is something the 9/11 
Commission found necessary in the U.S. also.36 
 
 Our questions about responsibility and intelligence operations in democracies 
were answered with the same level of absoluteness: It is always the respective 
minister’s responsibility. This is based on the needed link between the agencies 
the parliament. The minister is that link. When asked about when the minister 
receives bad intelligence by the agencies (if he or she still holds the responsibility) 
the answer remained the same, due to the fact that agencies operate under the 
minister’s legitimacy. 
 
 Both saw Danish intelligence developing towards more analysis and less field 
work in the future, along with a changing roster of employees. Where the PET and 
FET normally have been staffed with policemen or military officers, the future 
would like hold more analysts with humanitarian and other academic 
backgrounds. 
 
 Our final round of questioning to both was about their views on a more 
centralized EU intelligence operation. Both answered that a European CIA was 
very unlikely to ever happen, but that more integration between the national 
agencies was very likely to happen in the very near future.  
3.3.5. Case conclusions 
Danish intelligence is, as mentioned earlier, facing several problems. Some are 
relating to the actual conduction of intelligence. These problems are of course 
very interesting to try to provide answers and critique to, however our task is to 
answer on the problems concerning oversight and management of the intelligence 
communities. Compared to that of the US and the UK, the Danish intelligence 
communities are quite small. It’s seems much easier to get a good understanding 
of how things are done than compared to the two other cases we have dealt with 
thus far. Despite this, we must say that the Danish openness policy employed by 
the intelligence agencies and ministries is, despite good intentions, only scratching 
the surface of the agencies’ activities. The policies behind it are all still covered 
with the classic politicizing of foreign and defense policy. This will probably 
serve the fact that the agencies might be more known because of their mere 
existence, but their activities will still be kept very secret, even many of the old 
ones from the cold-war. One Denmark’s major intelligence problems is that 
hardly anyone seems to know of the oversight methods employed, when 
comparing to the US and the UK cases where the Senate intelligence oversight 
committee and the returning Lord investigations such as the Hutton and Butler 
reports in the UK. No willingness seems to be present in Danish politics today to 
                                                 
36 Ref. To the 9/11 commission report page 413 with the proposed intelligence organizational 
structure, with the new Open-Source Agency placed in the same branch as the CIA 
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actually change the intelligence oversight methods. Denmark could apply the 
same type of oversight as the US, but establishing a parliamentary oversight 
committee that are not totally secret such as the present one. The public hearings 
in the US senate committees might be a waste of time for some, but it serves the 
public and in particular the press to get insight to secret government activities in 
order to bring more legitimacy to those activities. 
 
 Like so many other countries Denmark is, compared to US intelligence policy 
and declassification, still far behind, despite that Danish politicians are proud of 
the openness in the administration and intelligence agencies in general.  
 
 The basic idea of intelligence oversight is to get the public to understand that 
politicians are not trying to hide the events from them, but rather are only hiding 
some of the methods and knowledge gained as part of the larger intelligence 
picture. Some things need to be kept secret in order to conduct good intelligence. 
Like our interviews have shown, that is also what the politicians in charge think. 
Therefore, it seems to important to the Denmark that better oversight is to be 
implemented if the public should gain more trust in its intelligence agencies. 
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4. Conclusions 
What seems to the basic rule when it comes to responsibility inside democratic 
intelligence structures is that the ultimate responsibility always traces back to the 
minister, secretary or president in charge of that particular branch of intelligence. 
This is hardly a surprise to most people, what is interesting is that this ultimate 
responsibility is hardly ever invoked. What argues for this common thread of 
responsibility in democracies is the implementation of oversight committees and 
multi-layer analysis and evaluation of intelligence. A major problem is, as 
mentioned before, that most ministers, secretaries and other high ranking people 
in charge of the over-all intelligence conduction, are eluding their responsibility 
with references to bad agency management and poor investigatory skills by the 
agency employees. What can be observed in today’s intelligence debates, is that 
upon the failures of estimating Iraq’s possession of WMD before the invasion, 
and that of the 9/11 attacks, no minister, secretary or head of government has been 
forced from office in any of the three cases. Neither has the public voted37 those in 
power out of office. The decision to hold those in power responsible is left to the 
people when they are choosing their elected officials. One of the classic virtues of 
democracy is that the public has a responsibility for choosing those they find best 
suited for the job. Part of the responsibility of conducting intelligence today falls 
back on the public. If the public is well informed of its nation’s intelligence 
activities, they hold a responsibility to act whenever failures do occur, and can’t 
simply wait for the politicians to act. 
 
 For the public to take this responsibility and act on it, it needs to be informed 
of the activities of its government, this is why oversight of clandestine 
government operations, such as intelligence activities, are so important. As this 
study shows, different intelligence communities and political environments 
produces various types of oversight mechanisms. One of the major problems with 
producing a legitimate oversight procedure, is to separate it from those it 
investigates. Since most politicians agree that they are ultimately responsible for 
the actions of their intelligence agencies, some oversight procedures needs to 
separated from the politicians, and done by independent committees. Another key 
issue in modern democracies is information to the public. The level of information 
provided by in particular the Danish and British intelligence agencies are quite 
unsatisfactory compared to the U.S. disclosure on historical events concerning 
intelligence activities. For intelligence agencies and the democratic governments 
who run them to stay legitimate, more information about their intelligence 
activities are much needed. 
                                                 
37 Currently only the US has hold general elections since the invasion of Iraq, however both Prime 
Minister Blair and Prime Minister Fogh Rasmussen seems in the latest polls to maintain power 
should there be elections at the time of publishing this paper, Blair are though somewhat 
challenged. 
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4.1.2. Abbreviations 
C3I Control, Command, Communications & Intelligence 
C4I Control, Command, Communication, Computers & Intelligence 
CIA Central Intelligence Agency 
CIO Central Imagery Office 
DCI Director of Central Intelligence 
DoD The Department of Defense 
FET Forsvarets Efterretningstjeneste, Danish Military and Foreign Intelligence Agency 
GCHQ Government Communications Headquarters 
HumInt Human Intelligence 
Imagery Optical and Photo Intelligence 
MI5 Military Intelligence section 5, British Security Intelligence Agency 
MI6 Military Intelligence section 6, British Secret Intelligence Server 
MoD Ministry of Defense 
NID National Intelligence Director 
NSA National Security Agency 
PET Politiets Efterretningstjeneste, Danish Security Intelligence Agency 
SigInt Signals Intelligence 
SIS Secret Intelligence Service 
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